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We introduce the minority game theory for two kinds of the Korean treasury bond (KTB) in
Korean futures exchange markets. Since we discuss numerically the standard deviation and the
global efficiency for an arbitrary strategy, our case is found to be approximate to the majority
game. Our result presented will be compared with numerical findings for the well-known minority
and majority game models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than one decade, the minority game [1, 2] is a simple and familiar model that has received considerable
attention as one interdisciplinary field between physicists and economists. There has primarily been concentrated on
calculating and simulating in various ways for the game theories such as the evolutionary minority game [3− 5], the
adaptive minority game [6, 7], the multi-choice minority games [8], the $-game model [9], and the grand canonical
minority games. Challet et al [10] have introduced the stylized facts that the stock prices are characterized by
anomalous fluctuations and exhibited the fat tailed distribution and long range correlation. Moreover, it reported from
previous works [11−14] that the grand canonical minority game reveal the important stylized facts of financial market
phenomenology such as return changes and volatility clusterings. Ferreira and Marsili [11] studied the dynamical
behavior of statistical quantities between different types of traders, using the minority games, the majority game, and
the $-game.
Recently, researchers have treated mainly with Arthor’s bar model, the seller and buyer’s model in financial markets,
and the passenger problem in the metro and bus, etc. They have considered several ways of rewarding the agent’s
strategies and compared the resulting behaviors of the configurations in minority game theory. De Almeida and
Menche [15] have also investigated two options rewarded in standard minority games that choose adaptive genetic
algorithms, and their result is found to come close to that of standard minority games. Kim et al [16] analyzed the
minority game for patients that is inspired by de Almeida and Menche’s problem.
Recent studies based on approaches of statistical physics have applied the game theory to financial models. To
our knowledge, it is of fundamental importance to estimate numerically and analytically the Korean options. In this
paper, we present the minority game theory for the transaction numbers of two kinds of KTB in the Korean futures
exchange market. For the sake of simplicity, we limit ourselves to numerically discuss the standard deviation and
the global efficiency for particular strategies of our model, using the minority game payoff. In Section 2, we discuss
market payoffs and statistical quantities in the game theory. We present some of the results obtained by numerical
simulations and concluding remarks in the final section.
II. MINORITY AND MAJORITY GAMES
First of all, we will introduce the dynamical mechanism of both the minority game and the majority game. We
assume that the agents N can decide independently whether to buy or to sell the stock at round m. When the
information and the strategy take, respectively, the value µ(t) and S at time t, the action of the i-th agent is
presented in terms of ai,s
µ(t)(t). one agent can submit an order ai,s
µ(t)(t) = 1 (buy) or ai,s
µ(t)(t) = −1 (sell), and the
aggregate value, i.e., the sum of all action of agents, is given by A(t) =
∑N
i=0 ai,s
µ(t)(t). The payoffs Ui,s
mn(t) and
Ui,s
mj(t) for minority game and majority game models are, respectively, represented in terms of
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FIG. 1: Plot of functional forms for the standard deviation σ as a function of the round m in the minority game and the
majority game models. The standard deviation has an optimal value in the minority game model while it takes the decreasing
value near zero as the round m goes to large value in majority game model.
Ui,s
mn(t+ 1) = Ui,s
mn(t)− ai,s
µ(t)A(t) (1)
and
Ui,s
mj(t+ 1) = Ui,s
mj(t) + ai,s
µ(t).A(t). (2)
From the aggregate value A(t), the standard deviation of A(t) is defined by
σ = [
1
N
N∑
i=1
< (A2(t) >]1/2, (3)
where the bar denotes the average taken over realizations. The statistical quantities σ2 and σ2/N are, respectively,
the volatility of A(t) and the global efficiency.
To evaluate the statistical quantity Φ =< A(t)A(t + 1) > / < A2(t) >, i.e., the ratio of autocorrelation to the
volatility, two points of view are characterized as follows: The agents become the fundamentalists, who believe that
the stock price fluctuate around the equilibrium value for the case of Φ > 0, included the minority group and the
payoff of Eq. (1). On the contrary, the agents called chartists, who believe that the stock price has a trend followed as
Φ < 0, included the majority group and the payoff of Eq. (2). In the $-game, its numerical behavior of the statistical
quantities such as the autocorrelation and the volatility are well known to follow the minority game or the majority
game.
In order to assess the dynamical behavior for the minority game, the majority game, and the $-game, we can extend
to obtain statistical quantities such as the standard deviation, the volatility, the auto correlation, the self-overlap,
and the entropy, etc. We expect that these statistical quantities lead us to more general results. Generally, Fig. 1
shows functional forms for the standard deviation as a function of the round m in both the minority game and the
majority game.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
To estimate numerically the standard deviation and the volatility, N agents choose one among two possible options,
i.e., 1 or −1 ( buy and sell ) at each round m. The agents obtain the score +1 (−1) if the return belongs to be
smaller (larger) than zero. The agent’s action behaves independently without any communication or interaction. All
available information is other agent’s actions, that is, the memory of the past m rounds. There are 2m possible
different memories for each of the m rounds, and all different strategies is well known to contain 22
m
values. Our
model can extend to several values of strategy, but we limit ourselves to only two strategies S = 2 and S = 4.
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FIG. 2: Plot of the standard deviation σ versus m for a strategy S = 2 for KTB309 (circle) and KTB312 (triangle).
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FIG. 3: Log-log plot of the global efficiency σ2/N versus 2m/N for the strategy S = 2 for KTB309 (circle) and KTB312
(triangle).
From now, we introduce tick data of KTB309 and KTB312 transacted in Korean futures exchange market. We here
consider two different delivery dates: September KTB309 and December KTB312. The tick data for KTB309 were
taken from April 2003 to September 2003, while we used the tick data of KTB203 transacted for six months from July
2003. The Korean futures exchange market opens for 6 hours per one day except for weekends, and the total tick data
of one-minutely transactions are, respectively, about N = 1.8× 104 (KTB309) and N = 1.9× 104 (KTB312). For two
kinds of KTB in Korean futures exchange market, we found results of standard deviation σ versus m for the strategy
S = 2 in Fig. 2, after we estimate numerically the volatility from Eq. (3). Our result is expected to behavior in a way
which is similar to the minority game, but the dynamical behaviors for standard deviation and the global efficiency is
found to be similar to the patterns of the majority game. The global efficiency is found to take the decreasing value
near zero as the round m goes to large value, as shown in Fig. 3. For S = 4, the standard deviation and the global
efficiency are also found to take similar values of Figs. 3 and 4.
In conclusions, our case is found to be approximate by the majority game model for two kinds of the KTB309 and
KTB312. It is really found that the dynamical behavior of the standard deviation and the global efficiency for our
model is similar to those for the majority game while the El Farol bar model [1] and the patient model [16] belong to
a class of the minority game. In future, it is expected that the detail description of the minority game theory will be
used to study the extension of financial analysis in other financial markets.
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